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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO R. CASEY, 




Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11721 
STATEl\:IENT OF TIIE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff's complaint claims: 
1. Rental for motor grader in the sum of $2,589.30. 
2. Damages in the sum of $12,000.00 for the al-
leged failure and refusal of the defendant to use the 
motor grader after December 31, 1966. 
Puuitive damages in the sum of $15,000.00. 
( H:.!8) 
I 
Defendant appellant by amended answer denied 
generally the allegations of the complaint, (R16) and 
by amended counterclaim, set forth payments made on 
account of plaintiff which defendant claimed as an off-
set. (R17-18) 
The Fourth Cause of Action set forth in paragraph 
13 of defendant's amended answer and amended coun-
terclaim (R19) was stricken on motion of defendant. 
(R75) 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
District Court held that a net amount due from 
defendant to plaintiff for rental of the grader to De-
cember 21, 1966 was $468.47. (R53) It further held 
that the defendant failed and refused to use said motor 
grader after December 21, 1966, and plaintiff was dam-
aged by said failure in the sum of $6,123.00. (R53) 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against 
the defendant in the total sum of $6,591.47, together 
with costs. ( R42) Defendant appealed from that por-
tion of the judgment based on damages in the amount 
of $6,123.00 "for defendant's breach of rental agree-
ment on motor grader," from the order denying defend-
ant's motion to amend proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment and from the order of 
the court denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
(R61) 
2 
HELIEF SOCGIIT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of that portion of the judg-
ment of the District Court based on damages in the 
amount of $6,123.00 "For defendant's breach of rental 
agreement on motor grader" from the order <lenying 
defendant's motion to amend proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and judgment, or failing that, 
defendant requests an order remanding said action to 
District Court for a new trial on the single issue of 
damages. 
STATE:\IENT OF FACTS. Plaintiff entered 
into a subcontract and equipment lease agreement 
with defendant Nelson Brothers Construction Com-
pany in August of 1966 (Exhibit P-1) . In para-
graph 16 of Exhibit P-1 it provides for leasing by 
plaintiff to defendant of one No. 12 Caterpillar lVfotor 
Grader to be operated exclusively by R. E. Casey 
(Exhibit P-1, paragraph 16). A provision that R. C. 
Casey be the sole operator was for the benefit of 
<lefendant. ( ll99, lines 3 to 6 and :29-30) Thereafter, 
the sub-contract was terminated by agreement of the 
parties ( P-J ) and a new lease agreement for the use 
of the motor grader was entered into on October 24, 
HWn (Exhibit P-5). In this agreement, a stipulation 
was included that "the motor grader operator shall 
perform his duties to comply with Nelson Brothers 
Conslrudiou Company's superintendent," and further 
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provided that plaintiff could withdraw the machine 
from the job by giving two weeks' written notice. Com-
plaints were made by the government inspectors of 
the work done by Robert Casey, Sr. as operator of the 
motor grader. (Rl42, lines 21 to 29, Rl43 lines 24 
to 28) Some of Mr. Casey's work had to be done over 
(R144, lines 24 to 30) and the services of Robert Casey, 
Sr. were terminated on instructions of .Mr. Orin Nelson 
to .Mr. Wardle, superintendent and Wardle in-
structed .Mr. Stone, his assistant, to terminate him. 
(RI20, liens 7 to 13, and line 22) Mr. Robert Casey's 
services were terminated on November 18, 1966. (R145, 
lines 1 to 16) The plaintiff-respondent's motor grader 
was used by defendant four hours on the 19th of De-
cember, 1966, and for eight hours on December 20, 
1966 and for four hours on December 21, 1966, when 
plaintiff came and took the motor patrol at 12 :00 o'clock 
noon. ( R146, lines 5 to 12) to an unannounced and 
undisclosed destination. (RI40, lines 4 to 7, Rl70 lines 
1 to 4) There was a conflict of testimony as to the reason 
for plaintiff taking the motor grader away from the 
job. The court found that defendant ordered the 
plaintiff to remove it from the job. (R44, paragraph 
10) Plaintiff took the motor grader and parked it 
with the dealer in Gallup, New 
Mexico. (R90, lines 22 and 23) At that time, the plain-
tiff had a deal pending with Hamilton Construction 
Company in Gallup, who were bidding on a job, and 
if successful, they would use plaintiff's equipment and 
in so doing would make a place for the motor grader. 
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(R90, lines 24 to 30; R91, line 1 to 12) An Indian 
operated the motor patrol on December 19, 20 and 21, 
1966 and the door had been allowed to swing open 
and caught on one of the wheels and tore off the door 
and cracked the windshield, just prior to the removal 
of the grader. This caused Robert Casey to state when 
he was asked where he was going with the grader 
"\Ve're going to get it off the job before that Indian 
tears it up." (R187, lines 1 to 11) This damage was 
later repaired at Nelson Brothers' expense. (R 187, 
lines 12 to 15) Neither the plaintiff nor his father 
Rober Casey ever told the defendant or any of its 
employees or disclosed the location of the motor grader 
after the removal. (Hl40, lines 4 to 7 and Rl98, lines 
13 to 21) Prior to and at the time that the grader was 
removed from the defeudant's construction site, plaintiff 
had a deal pending with IIamilton Construction Com-
pany in Gallup who were bidding on a job, and if they 
were successful, they would use plaintiff's equipment, 
and would thus make a place for the use of the grader. 
(R90, lines 19 to .30 inclusive, R91 lines l to 14) 
Forty-one thousand six hundred twenty-three 
(-H,(i23) tons of sub-base and some gravel was put 
down up to December 21, 1966 while plaintiff Casey's 
motor grader was used together with Stone's grader, 
(Hl84'. lines l to 21) 12,381 tons on plaintiff's original 
subcnntrad and 29,242 more tons between October 24, 
and tlie: 21st dav of December, 1966. (Rl83, lines 27 
to 30 awl J l1> :21) J.7,000 tons were put down 
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after December 21, 1966 (R185, lines 3 to 5). 46.966(/c 
of the tons of the sub-base and gravel was laid down 
up to December 21, 1966. 47,000 tons or of 
all sub-base and gravel was laid down after December 
21, 1966. Tonnage-wise the gravel laid dmvn after 
December 21, 1966 was 112.9% of the tonnage of sub-
base and gravel laid down prior to December 21, 196ti. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1: THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN ALLO\VING "DAlHAGES FOR DE-
l-.ENDANT'S BREACH O.F RENTAL AGREE-
MENT ON MOTOR GRADER" IN THE 
OF $6,123.00 OR FOR ANY SUlH \VHATEVER. 
A. DEFENDANT HAD FULL AUTHOR-
ITY TO TER.MINATE THE SERVICES 
OF R. E. CASEY. 
The original subcontract and equipment lease 
covered the lease of the motor grader in paragraph 16 
and provided that it "is to be operated exclusively by 
R. E. Casey, and that contractor shall pay $10.50 an 
hour for its use, but in the event that R. E. Casey 
was incapacitated or otherwise unable to operate, then 
the rate to be paid for use of said grader with another 
operator to be selected and paid by contractor would 
be reduced to $8.50 per hour." (Exhibit P-1) This 
was thereafter terminated (Exhibit P-4) and a "lease 
agreement" was entered into October 24, 1966 (Ex-
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hi bit P-5) This also provided that the grader was "to 
be operated exclusively by R. E. Casey, Sr., whose 
wages shall be paid by Nelson Brothers Construction 
Company. The motor grader operator shall perform 
his duties to comply with Nelson Brothers Construction 
Company Superintendent." (Emphasis added) It thus 
appears clear that defendant could terminate the serv-
ices of R. E. Casey, Sr., if he failed to perform his 
duties to comply with their requirement. In addition, 
the plaintiff stated "that's immaterial to me who oper-
ates it (the motor grader), as long as Nelson's were 
satisfied." (R99, lines 27 to 30) 
R. E. Casey's services were terminated November 
18, 1966. (R145, lines 2 to 16) l\ilr. Strong was the 
assistant superintendent and was instructed by super-
intendent, l\ilr. Wardle, to terminate Robert Casey. 
(Rl20, lines 18 to 22). 
ll. PLAINTIFF ':VITHDRE'V FROl\I AND 
ABANDONED "LEASE AGREElVIENT" 
DATED OCTOBER 24, 1966 BY REl\IOV-
ING THE MOTOR GRADER FROl\I 
TIIE \VORK SITE AND NEVER IN-
FORl\IING THE DEFENDANT OF ITS 
LOCATION, OR THAT IT 'VAS 
AVAILABLE FOR USE BY DEFEND-
ANT AND THUS FORECLOSING ANY 
POSSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S USE 
OF THE SAME. 
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Based on conflicting evidence, the court held that 
the defendant ordered plaintiff to take the motor grader 
off the job. ( R54) Plaintiff removed the motor grader 
from the job on the 21st day of December, 1966. l\Ir. 
Robert Casey actually drove it from the site of the 
contract to an unannounced and undisclosed destina-
tion. (Rl45, lines 17 and 18, Rl46, lines 11 to 12, Rl40, 
lines 4 to 7, RI 70, lines 1 to 4) 
The Findings of Fact do not specify the time 
that the defendant allegedly ordered plaintiff to take 
the motor grader off the job. The plaintiff testified it 
was on December 21st, 1966, the date that it was re-
moved from the job. Other witnesses testified that l\Ir. 
Nelson was on the job on the 13th of December, but 
did not recall seeing him on th 21st of December, and 
thought that he would have known about it. Mr. Orin 
Nelson, officer of the defendant company, stated that 
he was there on the job on the 11th or 12th of De-
cember ( RI68, lines 8 to 13) and on the 17th of De-
cember, 1966. Defendant wanted to use the Casey 
grader but not being certain that they could use it 
without using .Mr. Robert Casey as the operator, sent 
a letter addressed to Leo Casey, Casey Construction 
Company, c/o Zia Motel, Gallup, New :l\Iexico, asking 
him generally about using the patrol. The original was 
never returned to the defendant. (R177) Receipt of 
this letter could have triggered the desire in plaintiff 
to remove the motor grader from the job. Plaintiff, 
at the time, was living at Zia l\1otel in Gallup. Plain-
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tiff denies receiving the letter. (RIOS, lines I6 to 25) 
It clearly appears that the plaintiff had selfish reasons 
for removing the motor grader, and he stated on direct 
examination that he had a deal pending with Hamilton 
Construction Company in Gallup. They were going 
to bid on a job, and if they were successful in getting 
it, they would use plaintiff's equipment and in so doing 
could make a place for the motor grader. That nego· 
tiation was under way prior to December 2I, 1966. 
(R90, lines 22 to 30, and R9I, lines I to 8) In any 
event, plaintiff moved the motor grader and, unbe-
known to defendant parked it at the Massey-Ferguson 
dealer in Gallup, (R90, lines I9 to 23, RI40 lines 4 
to 7, R 17 0, lines I to 4 ) which was some thirty miles 
away from the job site. (R90, lines I9 to 23, R78, lines 
2 and 3) Plaintiff never at any time informed the 
defendant or any of defendant's employees where the 
motor grader was taken, either the town or the premises 
within a town. ( RI40, lines 4 to 7, RI 70, lines I to 4, 
and RI 7I, lines I4 to I6) It would have been impos-
sible for defendant to use the motor grader after the 
21st day of December, not knowing the lot where it 
was located, and in fact not even the town that it had 
been taken to. If the plaintiff claimed that the lease 
agreement was still in effect, it would be incumbent 
upon him to inform the defendant that he was holding 
the motor grader subject to the terms of the lease 
agreement, where it was located and that they could 
use the same as provided in the lease with any operator 
that was satisfactory to the defendant Nelson Brothers 
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Construction Company. Taking the motor grader to 
an unannounced and undisclosed destination was wholly 
inconsistent with the existence of the contract aud 
defendant was powerless to do anything but acquiesce. 
This falls within the rule that a contract will be treated 
as abandoned where the acts of one party inconsistent 
with its existence are acquiesced in by the other. See 
Monroe vs. Fetzer, 350 P.2d 1012 (Wash.) The con-
tract may be mutually abandoned by the parties at any 
stage of its performance or before any performance 
has commenced, and by such abandonment each party 
is released from any further performance, (as in the 
instant action) or each party is released from any per-
formance at all. Honda vs. Reed, 319 P. 2d 728 (Calif.) 
See also Ferris vs. Blumhardt, 293 P. 2d 935 (Wash.) 
In the case of Jensen vs. Chandler, 291 P. 2d 1116 
(Idaho) the court said in part as follows : 
"A contract may be discharged by conduct as 
well as by words. 12 Am. J ur. Contracts lOll, 
Sec. 431. An abandonment of a contract by con-
sent may be implied from acts of the parties. 
Thompson vs. Municipal Bond Company, 23 
Calif. App. 2d 402, 73 P. 2d 274. Treadwell vs. 
Niclcel, 194 Calif. 243, 228 P. 25. 
"A rescission by consent is implied by refusal 
of one party to comply with the contract, in 
which refusal the other party has acquiesced. 
Carter vs. Fox, 11 Calif. App. 67, 103 P. 910; 
Mettler vs. Vance, 30 Calif. App. 499, 158 P. 
1044. 
"A contract will be treated as abandoned where 
the acts of one party inconsistent with its exist· 
10 
euee was acquiesced in by the other party. Hobbs 
zw. Colurnbia lt'alls 1Jrick Co., 1.57 1\-Iass. 109, 31 
N. E. 75ti. JI crµolslteimer vs. Christopher, 76 
Neb. 352, 107 N. \V. 082, 111 N. W. 359, 9 
L.R.A., N. S. 1127; King nian Colony Irr. Co. 
vs. Payne, 7'8 Or. 152 P. 891; 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts, para. 389, P. 882. 
"It is generally held that it is a question of 
ultimate faet as to whether a contract has been 
abandoned or mutually rescinded." 
The above portion of the opinion in Jensen vs. 
Chandler, supra, was quoted with approval in the case 
of C Qpenhaver vs. Lavin, 448 P. 2d 77 4 (Idaho) . The 
case of Griffin vs. Beresa, Incorporated, 300 P. 2d 31 
(Calif. ) , has facts that are more similar to the case 
at hand than most of the cases above quoted. Griffin 
performed work, labor and furnished material to de-
fendant for the construction of septic tanks and drains 
on defendant's property. There had been some mis-
understandmg as to financing and the quality of plain-
tiff's work was questioned and the defendant took over 
the job, including the personnel and equipment which 
Griffin had on the site. After Griffin went there and 
insisted that he had fully performed his contract and 
he was willing to go forward and complete it, never-
theless. he, after some conversation with appellant's 
supen·ising officers withdrew his equipment and sur-
rendered the job. The court stated in part of its opinion 
.ts follows: 
''An abandonment of a contract may be im-
plied from the acts of the parties, •••••ir 
11 
••••••and this 
may be accomplished by the repudiation of the 
contract by one of the parties and the acquies-
cence of the other party in such repudiation, 
and words of the parties to the effect that they 
are mutually rescinding the contract are not 
necessary. McCreary vs. Mercury Lumber Dis-
tributors, 124 Cal. App. 2d 477, 486, 268 P. 2d 
762." 
Attention also is invited to 17 Am. J ur. 2d, para-
graph 484, Abandonment, at page 954. 
Findings of Facts state "defendant failed and 
refu.sed to use said motor grader after December 21, 
1966" (R53, para 6, lines 6 and 7) It appears that 
this was based on the Finding No. 10 that defendant 
ordered plaintiff to take the motor grader off the job. 
(R54) It must, however, be kept in mind that imme· 
diately after plaintiff took the motor grader off the 
job, defendant had to rent two more motor graders to 
complete the job, and if the plaintiff did not elect to 
discontinue the agreement, it was incumbent upon him 
to notify the defendant that the motor grader was 
available, and give the location of the same, and that 
it was available to carry out the 'terms of the lease 
agreement. In view of the fact that plaintiff took the 
motor grader and placed it in a town some thirty miles 
distance and never notified the defendant where it was 
located so that defendant would be able to use the same 
to complete the contract despite plaintiff's protestations 
now that he did not discontinue the agreement, his 
actions making it impossible for the defendant to use 
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the motor grader were inconsistent with his alleged 
declared desire to continue the agreement; and if it is 
true that defendant ordered plaintiff to remove the 
motor grader which defendant does not admit and 
states is not true, then if this be considered a repudiation 
of the contract, the taking of the machine which was 
the subject of the lease agreement, the motor grader, 
to an undisclosed location can only be an acquiescence 
hy plajntiff in such repudiation. If the plaintiff wish<>d 
to continue with the agreement and intended tu charge 
the defendant with the rental to become due, it \Vas 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to keep the motm grader 
available for use by the defendant. His failure to do 
this was clearly an acquiescence in the action of the 
defendant alleged by plaintiff that the defendant 
ordered him to remove lhe motor grader from the job. 
lf the view is taken that defendant did not order the 
motor grader from the job, the results are the same. 
The motor grader was being used and was used up 
until noon of December 21, 1966, the day that it was 
removed from the job. This was known by the plain-
tiff because of the fad he questioned the ability of the 
operator who was handling the motor grader, and clearly 
the removal would be a breach by plaintiff and under 
these cirl'umstances the action or non-action of the 
<let'endant '\vould be considered acquiescence. In fact, 
the defendant was 11ot sure that he had the right to 
tht' motor grader wheu ming another operator. De-
lt·11dant also knew that plaintiff could terminate without 
,i llst by giving notice. 
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It appears_ that the plaintiff deliberately moved 
the motor grader from the work site without informing 
the defendant of its location so that he would have 
it available for a job that he hoped would soon come 
up; that in doing this, he breached the agreement him 
self, and made it impossible for the defendant to con-
tinue using the motor grader, and this despite the fact 
that the grader was being used on the very day that 
it was taken from the job, according to the evidence, 
during the noon hour on December 21, 1966. 
See cases cited in Sauder vs. Dittmar, 118 F. 2d 524, 
key numbers 9 to 12 inclusive at page 530. See also 
Wallace vs. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P. 2d 699, 
which cites the case of Monroe vs. Fetzer, supra. Also 
see Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 
491. 
C. DAMAGES 'i\TERE EXCESSIVE EVEN 
IF IT WAS ASSUMED THE AGREE· 
MENT WAS NOT ABANDONED NOR 
\\TITHDRA 'i\TN FROM BY PLAINTIFF. 
Mr. Nelson testified that the completed tallies shown 
in charge-order No. 4 showed that 12,381.1 tons were 
laid down and were handled by the two graders up to 
the termination of the subcontract on October 24, 
1966, and that 29,242 tons were laid down between 
October 24 and the 21st day of December, 1966, for 
a total tonnage of 41,623 tons handled by the Casey 
Motor grader and the other motor grader on the job 
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up to December 21st, 1900 ( Rl84) There were 47 ,000 
tons requiri11g the use of motor graders after the 21st 
of December, 196u, (Rl85, lines l to 7) for a total of 
88,(i23 tuns, and this makes J.l,o2a tons involved with 
the Casey and Stone motor graders, which amounts 
to 46.9G/; of the total. According to the uncontroverted 
testimony of :\Ir. Orin N e]son, the bulk of the grading 
was do11e when the Casey grader was used on the job, 
(R185, lines 14 to 17, R186, lines l but assuming 
that the same number of hours per ton would be re-
quired, which gives the advantage to the plaintiff, 
nccordiug to the only testimony on record in this respect, 
53.0.J.)r of the job that was done after the 21st day 
of December would then require a total of 393.05 hours, 
and using plaintiff's figure of $9.00 an hour, damages 
would not be more than $3,537..J.5. The judgment given 
by the court for damages of $6,123.00 exceeds this by 
$2,585.55 and there is no testimony controverting the 
exaet figures testified to by N e]son. 
POINT NO. 11: THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ERRED lK DEFENDANT'S l\IO-
TIOX FOR A NE'V TRIAL. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial was based on 
(a) :u·ciclent or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not ha re guarded against; ( b) to newly discovered 
e'_ideue.('. material for the defen<lr.nt which not 
w1tl1 r<'asonablc dilige11ee han: and pro-
duced at lhc trial under the circumstances; and (c) 
15 
excessive damages appearing to have been given un<ler 
the influence of passion or prejudice. ( R49) Affidavit 
in support of this motion of the attorney for defendant 
more fully sets forth the grounds of the motion for a 
new trial. 
J. Royal Andreason prepared the original plead-
ings and handled the case originally until his death. 
The present attorney for defendant was ill at the time 
the matter came to him, and this cut short the time to 
prepare for the case. The grounds (a) and ( c) are 
submitted on the affidavit above referred to. 
The newly discovered evidence, material for the 
defendant, consists of records which the affiant was nm 
able in the limited time available to discover which 
show that one grader was rented from Russ Caterpillar 
for one month, December 22, 1966 to January 22, 1Uli7, 
for $1,000.00 and was used for a total of 149 hours, 
in which time all of the balance of the work contern· 
plated by the contract with plaintiff was completed, 
including all the gravel laid and graded to allow the 
subcontractor 'V rockloff & Garner to complete the 
installation of the road mix bituminous surfacing 011 
the road. If the Casey grader were used for the UD 
hours required to finish the job at $9.00 per hour would 
make the total damages $1,341. Defendant 
that the plaintiff is entitled to no damages whatsoever. 
but that he could not justify damages in excess of $1,34< l 
POINT NO. III. THE DISTRICT COUR'f 
ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S l\IO· 
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TlON TO PROPOSED 
UF FACT _/lND CONCLUSIONS OF LA 1\V A:\TD 
JUDGMENT AS SET FORTI-I IN -
G-HAPHS 3 TO 12 INCLUSIVE OF SAID 
MOTION. 
Paragraphs 3 to 7 of said motion covered un-
disputed facts testified to at trial or contained in 
admitted exhibits. Paragraphs 8 to 12 of said motion 
had to do with the main issue of damages, which has 
beeu previously discussed in this brief. 
It is submitted that paragraphs 3 to 7 of said 
motion should be graute<l as a matter of course because 
they covered undbr·uted facts testified to at the trial, 
or contained in admitte<l exhibits. 
Paragraph 8 of said motion asked that the court 
find that the plaintiff had abandoned the contract. 
results would appear to be the same whether plaintiff 
abandoned the co11tract or acquiesced in the repudiation 
of the contract by defendant; and regardless of plain-
tiff's insistence that he did not withdraw from the con-
trad, the fact still remains that plaintiff removed the 
rnotur grader to a city unknown and to an unknown 
location in the unkrnm n city, and never at any time 
.1thised the defendant that it was aYailable for its use. 
lt appears that plaintiff's protestations that it didn't 
mah any difference to him who operated the grader 
so it satisfied the defendant, Nelson Brothers Co11-
... trud1on Compauy. is not carried out by his action. 
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It is further pointed out that it was virtually 
impossible to get hold of the plaintiff, and. if the plain· 
tiff really intended to stay with the contract, it wa) 
incumbent upon him to notify the defendant that hi 
was holding them on the contract, that the motor gra<ler 
was available at the definite location for the defendant 
to use in accordance with the lease agreement. Thi\ 
was not done and the location of the motor grader on 
any lot or even the city it was located in was newr 
divulged to the defendant. It is submitted that this i.1 
in fact abandonment of contract by the plaintiff, or 
it was an acquiescence in the repudiation by the de-
fendant if plaintiff's testimony is believed. A motion 
to strike paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 141 and to strike 
paragraph 15 of Conclusions of Law and substitute 
another paragraph therefor, and to amend paragraph 
16 and the judgment are all based on the facts pre· 
viously discussed. 
SUMMARY 
If the defendant did in fact tell plaintiff to get 
the motor grader off the job, then clearly the actio11 
of plaintiff in removing the same was acquiescence a11cl 
with greater finality by the taking of the motor grader 
to an unannounced destination, either as to city or 
location within a city is an act that is wholly inco11· 
sistent with the existence of the contract. The 
result is reached if the defendant's view is taken tha1 
defendant did not order the removal of the motor 
grader, and, therefore, the removal was an abando11· 
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me11 t by the plaintiff, wliieh abandonment the def 
wa:, forced to acquiesce in, first, because the location of 
the motor grader was unknown to defendant, and sec· 
011d, because the defendant was not certain that he had 
absolute right to use the motor grader when not using 
R. E. Casey as the operator. Furthermore, defendant 
was aware that under the terms of the lease agreeme:1t, 
plaintiff could withdraw hy giving two weeks' notice 
in any eYent, so defendant was not certain that plain-
tiff would allow defernlant to use the motor grader 
to complete the job. Defendant is entitled to a judgment 
reYersing that portion of the judgment of the District 
Court based on damages in the amount of $t>,li3 "for 
defendant's breach of rental agreement on motor grad-
er,'' or failing that: 
A. That an order be entered remauding said actiou 
to the District Court for a new trial only as to damages 
suffered by plaintiff due to defendant's alleged failure 
and refusal to use said motor grader. Or failing that; 
B. That an order be entered reducing the element 
of <lamages from $6, I i3 to as the only amount 
supported by definite figures produced at the trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REED II. RICIIARDS 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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